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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit decided relatively few significant cases in
the area of lands and natural resources during the past term. This
overview will examine cases decided involving the substantive
areas of public lands, condemnation, water and water quality,
interstate land sales, and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969.'

I.

PUBLIC LANDS

One decision involving the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior to revoke grazing licenses issued under the Taylor Grazing Act,2 Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton,3 is commented on
separately.' The other two cases of note dealing with public lands
involved a trust established pursuant to a federal land grant to
New Mexico and the administration of the federal coal prospecting and leasing program on the public lands.
A.

Trust Lands

In United States v. New Mexico5 the state appealed a summary judgment order entered by the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico in favor of the United States,
twenty-eight individual miners, and the United Mine Workers of
America, plaintiff-intervenors. The United States sought to enforce the terms of a grant of 100,000 acres of federal lands to the
state in trust for the maintenance of "a miners' hospital." ' The

2

42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-4347 (1970).
43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970).
531 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1976).

The case comment on Diamond Ring Ranch follows this overview.
536 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1325. Fifty thousand acres were granted to the Territory of New Mexico by
the Ferguson Act for a "miners' hospital." Act of June 21, 1898, ch. 489, 30 Stat. 484. An
additional 50,000 acres were granted by the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act for
"miners' hospitals for disabled miners." Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557. That
Act imposed a trust upon the lands for the purposes designated and provided that:
Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value
directly or indirectly derived therefrom, for any object other than that for
which such particular lands, or the lands from which such money or thing
of value shall have been derived, were granted or confirmed, or in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust.

Id. § 10.
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state, in its constitution, had accepted the conditions imposed on
the land grant trusts7 and, in accepting the lands, stated that
they would be "exclusively used for the purpose" for which they
were granted. 8 Pursuant to the grant, the state had established
and maintained the Miners' Hospital of New Mexico at Raton as
a general purpose hospital with a separate board of trustees and
separate trust account.' In 1968 the state reorganized the administration of its health care facilities. This led to a closing of the
special revenue trust account for the Miners' Hospital, a commingling of revenues with the income received from other state facilities, and a downgrading of the hospital from a general purpose to
an "intermediate care" facility, requiring that Miners' patients
in need of surgical or other special treatments be served by other
state facilities with payment for such outside care being charged
0
to the income from the Miners' trust funds.'
The United States sought and obtained a determination that
the state had breached the trust provisions governing the land
grants. The district court ordered the state to upgrade the Miners' Hospital and maintain it as a general purpose facility, to
cease the commingling of trust funds and spend them only for
Miners', and to restore certain funds spent for outside care to the
trust." The court refused to apply the cy pres rationale proposed
by the state'" and disallowed a setoff for administrative costs
claimed by the state for the operation of Miners'. Except for the
disallowance of a setoff, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af3
firmed the district court decision.'
N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 9.
Id. art. XIV, § 2.
536 F.2d at 1326.
,0 Id. Under the state hospital certification and licensing framework, a general purpose hospital provides a full range of medical services, including surgical and maternity
care, while an "intermediate care facility" provides only basic health care to in-patients
without full-time physician supervision, but does not provide surgical or other special
treatment services. See also 45 C.F.R. § 234.130(d)(3) (1976).
536 F.2d at 1326.
,2 Id. The cy pres doctrine is an equity function that will, "when a charity is originally
or later becomes impossible, inexpedient, or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute another charitable object which is believed to approach the original purpose as closely as
possible." G.G. BoGmrr & G.T. BoGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 431 (2d ed.
1964). It does not appear that a cy pres approach has ever been used in the past in dealing
with trusts created by federal land grants to the states, and it appears from the facts here
that its rejection was appropriate in this case. Maintenance of the Miners' Hospital had
not become clearly impossible, inexpedient, or impracticable.
11 The state had argued that it should be allowed to offset against the funds to be
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The affirmation was based essentially upon the proposition
that the trust provisions of the Enabling Act should be strictly
and literally construed. The Tenth Circuit relied upon three prior
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Act, Lassen
v. Arizona Highway Department," Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v.
Arizona,'5 and Ervien v. United States." While each to some extent indicated that the trust provisions of the Act should be
strictly construed, none would have necessarily called for the
holding here. Lassen and Alamo both involved interpretations of
the Act's provisions for and restrictions on state disposition of the
trust lands. Lassen indicated that the reason for a literal approach to the language of the Act was to insure "that the grants
provide the most substantial support possible to the beneficiaries
and that only those beneficiaries profit from the trust.""
Only Ervien directly dealt with proper utilization by the
state of the proceeds derived from trust lands. That case declared
that a New Mexico statute authorizing the use of three percent
of the income from trust land funds for advertisement to attract
settlers to the state was invalid as a breach of trust. The Court
stated: "There is in the Enabling Act a specific enumeration of
the purposes for which the lands were granted and the enumeration is necessarily exclusive of any other purpose.""
On the basis of these strict interpretation approaches that
arose in what are arguably somewhat dissimilar situations, the
Tenth Circuit rejected New Mexico's argument that its use of the
funds was valid and was in furtherance of the general intent
behind the grant: attending to the health needs of disabled miners. The court, looking at the express words of the Act, held that
returned to the Miners' revenue trusts the portion of the administrative costs incurred by
the state in operating Miners' during the period of centralized administration. Because it
concluded that the breach of trust involved was not motivated by bad faith and was of a
"technical nature," the Tenth Circuit ordered a modification of the district court judgment insofar as it disallowed the setoff. 536 F.2d at 1329-30.
1 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
Is 424 U.S. 295 (1976).
251 U.S. 41 (1919).
'; 385 U.S. at 467. In support of its decision in United States v. New Mexico, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized language in Lassen to the effect that "Itihe Enabling Act
unequivocally demands both that the trust receive the full value of any lands transferred
from it and that any funds received be employed only for the purposes for which the land
was given." 536 F.2d at 1327 (quoting 385 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added by Tenth Circuit)).
" 251 U.S. at 47.
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the purpose of the trust was the establishment and maintenance
of a "miners' hospital" and that providing for the health needs
of miners in other facilities was not within the express purposes
of the trust so as to allow the trust fund to be charged for the cost
of such treatment. 19
This very narrow reading of the "purpose" of this trust land
grant may raise some serious questions for state officials seeking
some flexibility in the administration of various land grant
trusts.2" Does this mean, for example, that income funds derived
from lands granted in trust to be used for "schools and asylums
for the deaf, dumb, and the blind"'" could not be expended in a
community-based treatment and rehabilitation program?
The decision here also calls into question the continuing validity of cases dealing with grants to New Mexico of about 500,000
acres for "the establishment of permanent water reservoirs for
irrigating purposes. ' 22 The New Mexico Supreme Court has upheld the validity of statutes making appropriations from the trust
funds arising from these lands for purposes which go beyond the
"establishment of permanent water reservoirs." It has been that
court's view that, "so long as the legislative and administrative
policy is within the fundamental purpose and the reasonable
meaning of the limitation," 23 the trust funds could be used for
such things as construction and maintenance of ditches and canals not connected with a permanent reservoir, construction of
flood control projects with incidental irrigation benefits, and joint
contractual arrangements with Arizona and the United States for
surveys of available ground water resources. 2 This broad inter" 536 F.2d at 1327.

" The extent and administration of federal grants of land in trust to the states are
discussed in U.S. PUBUc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION STAFF, LAND GRANTS TO STATES
(1970).
1'Grants of between 30,000 to 200,000 acres have been made to the states of Arizona,
Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming for such a specifically enumerated purpose.
Id. at 27-33.
2 This grant was contained in the Ferguson Act, ch. 489, § 6, 30 Stat. 484 (1898) and
was imposed with the same trust provisions applicable to the Miners' Hospital by the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 10, 36 Stat. 557 (1910). See note 6 supra.
'" State v. Ulibarri, 34 N.M. 184, 279 P. 509 (1929).
2,Id. See State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm'n v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d
622 (1963), for an example of the tensions many states have experienced in dealing with
a strict construction approach to trust lands. Compare Bryant v. Board of Examiners, 130
Mont. 512, 305 P.2d 340 (1956), in which a sharply divided court held that expenditure of
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pretation of the purpose of a grant seems now to have been specifically rejected by the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit decision is also significant for the degree
to which it scrutinized the adequacy of the facility in question.
New Mexico asserted that it should be allowed to continue operating the Miners' Hospital as a limited care facility so long as the
needs of miners were being met. The district court ordered the
state to upgrade the facility so as to be eligible for licensing and
certification as a full service, general purpose hospital. 5 The
Tenth Circuit, after an examination of the semantics involved in
the congressional use of the word "hospital," concluded that Congress intended the hospital established pursuant to the grant to
be a full service facility that provided surgical care, and so affirmed the lower court order."6
This is the only reported case in which it appears that a
federal court has interjected itself so far into the actual management or operation of a state facility established pursuant to the
provisions of a federal land grant. The authority for the judicial
supervision exercised by the Tenth Circuit apparently was premised on the fact that "as trustee, New Mexico has the primary
responsibility for administering Miners' Hospital, but the United
States also 'has a continuing interest in the administration' of the
trusts created by the Enabling Act." 2 The court here extended a
continuing interest in the administration of the trusts themselves
to a continuing interest in the quality and operation of the facilities established pursuant to the trusts. Whether the United
States might now be able to secure federal judicial examination
trust funds for needed remodeling of the state capitol was not a permitted purpose under
Montana's Enabling Act grant of lands for the "erection" of a capitol building, with State
ex rel. Morgan v. State Bd. of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 309 P.2d 336 (1957), in which a
sharply divided court overruled Bryant after a short life of only several months.
' 536 F.2d at 1327.
" Id. at 1327-29. This conclusion was buttressed by a reference to the fact that the
hospital established after the initial grant of 50,000 acres in 1898 (see note 6 supra)
provided surgical care, thus evidencing New Mexico's original interpretation of the grant.
"By granting an additional 50,000 acres for the same trust purpose [in the New MexicoArizona Enabling Act] Congress impliedly consented to New Mexico's interpretation of
the Ferguson Act." Id. at 1329. It is arguable whether Congress' implied consent to New
Mexico's original interpretation is equivalent to an expression of Congress' intent sufficient to bind New Mexico's present action.
27 536 F.2d at 1328 (quoting Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295
(1976)).
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of the quality and operation of common schools, universities, and
penitentiaries established throughout the country under similar
land grant provisions is now open to question. It has been argued
that New Mexico's administration of its grazing program on trust
lands constitutes a breach of trust because of the low fees received
and the severe over-grazing that is allowed. 8 This Tenth Circuit
decision would seem to provide the doctrinal basis for close judicial investigation of such an argument.
B.

Coal Leasing

Hunter v. Morton 9 was an appeal from a summary judgment
in favor of the defendant, Secretary of the Interior, entered by the
United States District Court for the District of Utah. The appellants had filed three applications for coal prospecting permits
with the Bureau of Land Management Land Office in Salt Lake
City. In 1968 the Land Office Manager rejected one of the applications entirely and a portion of the acreage in the other two
applications. The appellants were informed that they had thirty
days in which to post the bond required for issuance of permits
upon the non-rejected acreage and in which to appeal the rejections. While appealing the rejection decision, 30 the applicants delayed in obtaining permits upon the non-rejected acreage, apparently intending to take this step after appeals were completed.
Before administrative review was exhausted, the Secretary of the
Interior issued an order suspending the coal prospecting permit
system until further notice and calling for rejection of all pending
3
permit applications .
On the basis of this order, appellants' appeals were dismissed
and their applications were rejected. The Department also refused to issue permits for the acreage initially approved. 32 The
appellants then sought to compel issuance of permits on the initially approved acreage through a mandamus proceeding. In this
2 Comment, Administration of Grazing Leases of State Lands in New Mexico: A
Breach of Trust, 15 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 581 (1975).
- 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976).
Appeal from the decision of the Land Office Manager was taken to the Director of
the Bureau of Land Management. The Director's approval was then appealed to the Board
of Land Appeals. The appeals procedure is now somewhat modified and is controlled by
43 C.F.R. §§ 4.400-4.415 (1976).
31 Int. Dep't Order No. 2952, 38 Fed. Reg. 4682 (1973).
32 529 F.2d at 647-48.
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appeal from the district court summary judgment, the appellants
pressed four arguments: First, that they had a vested interest in
the permits by reason of the initial Land Office approval of some
of the applied for acreage, and that that interest could not be
defeated by the subsequent order of the Secretary; second, that
the order had become part of the administrative proceedings on
the applications, thus bringing into play all the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act;3 third, that the doctrine of estoppel should prevent rejection of their applications with respect to
the initially approved acreage; 34 and fourth, that the Secretary's
order was invalid because of a failure to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.15 All four arguments were rejected.
" Appellants apparently contended that the effect of the order in terminating their
administrative appeal and rejecting their applications should make the order reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970), notwithstanding its
otherwise exempt status as a general statement of policy concerning federal property. Id.
§ 553. This argument was summarily rejected by the court. 529 F.2d at 649.
", 529 F.2d at 649. The court, while noting that it did not contend that the estoppel
doctrine "can never be applied as to public lands," held that there was no factual basis
for invocation of the doctrine in this case. Id. For an example of the operation of estoppel
arguments in the public lands context, compare United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406
(9th Cir. 1975) (estoppel against Bureau of Land Management) with Union Oil Co. v.
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit has rejected an assertion of
estoppel against actions of the Secretary of Interior in the past. United States v. Ohio Oil
Co., 163 F.2d 633 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 833 (1947).
11The argument that the Secretary's order was invalid for failure to file an environmental impact statement pursuant to section 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), has
been considered several times. Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Duvels,
Inc. v. Frizzel, No. C-75-175 (D. Utah, June 6, 1976); Albrechtson v. Morton, No. C-39273 (D. Utah, Mar. 30, 1976); Goodwin v. Andrus, No. C-5105 (D. Colo., Nov. 25, 1975);
American Nuclear Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb. 26, 1975). The Secretary's
order recited that:
I have determined that the issuance of this order is not such a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment as to
require the preparation of an environmental impact statement under Section
102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(c)).
Order No. 2952, 38 Fed. Reg. 4682, 4683 (1973).
The argument has been successful in both Albrechtson v. Morton, No. C-392-73 (D.
Utah, Mar. 30, 1976), and American Nuclear Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb.
26, 1975). The ruling in American Nuclear was left standing upon appeal. American
Nuclear Corp. v. Kleppe, No. 75-1708 (10th Cir., Feb. 3, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication). District Judge Ritter, who decided Albrechtson, reached a contrary conclusion
several months later in Duvels, Inc. v. Frizzel, No. C-75-175 (D. Utah, June 6, 1976). The
noncompliance argument was analyzed and rejected in Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235
(D.C. Cir. 1976), in which the court unaccountably cited both Albrechtson and American
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In rejecting appellants' contention that they had acquired a
vested right to the acreage applied for, the Tenth Circuit relied
on the well established rule that no protectable property interest
is created by a mere application or offer for a lease upon public
lands." Extension of this principle to an application for a prospecting permit as opposed to a lease seems consistent with the
underlying rationale for the principle. The issuance of a prospecting permit, like the decision to lease, is discretionary with the
Department,3 7 and no rights should vest until that discretion has
been fully exercised.
No direct consideration was given to the issue of whether the
approval of some of the acreage in the appellants' applications
might have created some vested right beyond the mere hope of
vesting created by an application. Although the appellants
argued that this approval gave them a better status than that of
a mere applicant, there does not appear to be any authority to
support such a contention. However, the rationale for not recognizing vested rights breaks down after approval has been given.
After approval of some of the applied for acreage, no further
discretion could have been exercised by any officer of the Interior
Department. All that remained was for the applicant to post the
required bond and file forms within thirty days. 8 The Tenth Circuit appears to have held that the appellants' failure to act with
regard to the approved acreage within the allowed thirty days, in
effect, terminated the initial approval and relegated appellants
to a "mere applicant" status. 9 A more difficult case might have
arisen had the Secretary's order been issued during that thirtyday response period.
II. CONDEMNATION
United States v. 20.53 Acres of Land" involved the taking by
the United States of several parcels of land near Downs, Kansas,
Nuclear in support of its decision. The argument appears to have been rejected here
because it was not properly developed at trial. 529 F.2d at 649.
11 McTiernan v. Franklin, 508 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1975); Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d
200 (10th Cir. 1971); Schraier v. Hickel, 419 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Duesing v. Udall,
350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1966). Cf. American Nuclear
Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb. 26, 1975).
30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
529 F.2d at 647.
"Id. at 648.
0 527 F.2d 1000 (10th Cir. 1976).
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for development of the Glen Elder Dam and Reservoir. Some of
the land adjoined Downs' sewage treatment plant and the taking
necessitated a relocation of the effluent outfall pipe. An original
award of $220,000 to the city was reversed on an earlier appeal
because of an erroneous finding that the whole facility was being
taken.'
Upon rehearing, the city was awarded $28,997 for potential
future operating costs of a chlorination plant the United States
built in connection with the reservoir project.4" The plant was
required because of Kansas health regulations pertaining to discharges into recreational waters. Compensation was awarded on
the basis that the city might at some future time have to take over
operation of the chlorination facility. Rather than reverse merely
on the speculative nature of the award, the Tenth Circuit adopted
an approach used by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 4 3 and held

that, since the need for the chlorination plant arose because of
state regulations rather than federal requirements, there was no
compensable claim for the added treatment costs."
In opinions in two consolidated cases involving condemnation of a pipeline easement from the Texas Panhandle to Red
Oak, Oklahoma,45 the Tenth Circuit found that the findings of the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma complied
with the requirements of United States v. Merz4" as to what must
be disclosed about the valuation procedure used to determine
compensation. After a detailed review of the record, the court
concluded that the compensation awards were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. In both opinions
the court concluded that under Oklahoma iaw the proper mea" United States v. 20.53 Acres of Land, More or Less, 478 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973).
42

527 F.2d at 1001.

City of Eufaula v. United States, 313 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1963). See also United
States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, More or Less, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1025 (1966); City of Milford, 190 Ct. Cl. 941 (1970).
" 527 F.2d at 1001.
Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. A Right of Way 80 Feet in Width, Nos. 74-1534, -1535,
-1536, and -1537 (10th Cir., Oct. 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Arkansas La.
Gas Co. v. A Right of Way 80 Feet in Width, Nos. 75-1157 and -1158 (10th Cir., Feb. 20,
1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" 376 U.S. 192 (1964). The Merz requirements are that a commission in an eminent
domain proceeding must specify the basis for its value findings and must indicate the
general route it followed in determining such value. Id. at 198-99.
"
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sure of damages when a portion of a tract is taken is the difference
between the market value of the entire tract before taking and the
market value of the tract remaining.47 To arrive at this measure,
expert testimony as to specific types of damage to the remaining
portions was considered. This was held to be proper under Oklahoma law as evidence of depreciation in market value48 and the
awards were affirmed.
III.

WATER AND WATER QUALITY

A significant Indian water rights decision, New Mexico v.
Aamodt," is commented upon separately in this issue.50 Also of
significance are two decisions of the Tenth Circuit dealing with
regulations on effluents from petroleum refining point sources 5
promulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 5 pursuant to authorization in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.13 Both opinions arose
in suits brought by the American Petroleum Institute and ten
private companies involved in petroleum refining and related activities. One resolved the purely procedural issue of proper forum,
while the other reached the validity of the regulations themselves.
A.

The Proper Forum

At issue in American Petroleum Institute v. Train54 was
whether jurisdiction to review the challenged regulations5 properly lay with the district court or the court of appeals. Suit had
been brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado and had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 6
"' McInturff v. Oklahoma Nat. Gas Transmission Co., 475 P.2d 160 (Okla. 1970);
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Emerson, 377 P.2d 565 (Okla. 1962).
11See State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Bowles, 472 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970) (evidence
of gross sales before and after change in access road); State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v.
Robb, 454 P.2d 313 (Okla. 1969).
4' 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1157 (1977).
A case comment on Aamodt follows this overview.
40 C.F.R. §§ 419.10-.56 (1976).
52 Administrative notice of Apr. 30, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 16560 (1974), as corrected by
Notice of Sept. 4, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 32614 (1974), as amended by Notice of May 9, 1975,
40 Fed. Reg. 21939 (1975).
13 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
" 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 See note 51 supra.
*4526 F.2d at 1344.
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The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 provide that review of actions of the Administrator under
authority of section 30151 is to be in the court of appeals." Review
of actions taken under authority of section 30411 is not specifically
provided for in the Act and, therefore, would be in the district
court. Since both sections were relied upon by the Administrator
in promulgation of the regulations,60 proper jurisdiction was at
issue. Appellants argued that section 301 was improperly relied
upon by the Administrator and that thus review in the court of
appeals was improper.6 '
The Tenth Circuit, following the approach to this issue that
had been taken in the Second,6" Third, 3 Fourth, 4 and Seventh"
Circuits and has been subsequently followed in the District of
Columbia Circuit 6 with respect to similar promulgations for various industries, refused to consider the issue of the Administrator's statutory authority in connection with the jurisdictional
issue. Whether or not statutory authority under section 301 existed, that section was claimed as a basis in part for the regulations. That being the case, review by the court of appeals was the
only proper procedure. 8 The Supreme Court has confirmed this
reasoning in its recent affirmance of the Fourth Circuit du Pont
69

case.

5' 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 1369(b)(1)(E).
5, Id. § 1314.
40 C.F.R. § 401.10 (1976).
' 526 F.2d at 1345.
62 Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) (phosphates).
e American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975) (iron and steel
manufacturing).
64 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train (du Pont I), 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977) (inorganic chemicals).
63 American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1975) (meat products).
66 American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (potato processing industry).
6, 526 F.2d at 1345, 1346. A contrary result was obtained in the Eighth Circuit where,
in an opinion rejected by the Tenth Circuit, it was held that, since the Administrator had
no authority to issue the challenged regulations under section 301, the court of appeals
had no jurisdiction to review. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975) (corn
wet milling).
526 F.2d at 1345-46.
6 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977), afl'g 528 F.2d 1136
(4th Cir. 1975), 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).
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B.

The Merits
The same plaintiffs who asserted the jurisdictional issue in
American Petroleum Institute v. Train0 concurrently filed a petition for direct review of EPA action with the court of appeals.
Thus, in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,7 the Tenth Circuit reached and decided the merits of the Administrator's effluent regulations for petroleum refining point sources. 72 Space
limitations do not permit an exhaustive examination of the issues
involved. The essential issue, however, was whether the EPA has
statutory authority to impose effluent limitations on existing
sources by regulation or whether EPA may merely promulgate
guidelines for existing sources, leaving the imposition of regulations to state permit authorities. Resolution of this issue involved
an interpretation of the scope and interrelationship of EPA authority under sections 3017 and 3047 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 71 Both sections were cited
by the Administrator as authority for the regulations, and the
regulations impose "effluent limitations guidelines.

'76

The issue

arose because section 304 seems to authorize the EPA only to
publish "regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations
...
.,7Appellants argued that "guidelines" could not impose
binding requirements but rather should only serve as guidance for
state permit authorities. EPA, on the other hand, relied on section 301, which calls for the definition of control technologies by
the Administrator and for the establishment of effluent limitations."
70 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.

71 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976).
72 See notes 51-52 supra.
13 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975).
74Id.

§ 1314.

7 Id. §§ 1251-1376.
76 40 C.F.R. § 401.10 (1976). This is the statement of scope and purpose for all of
EPA's Subchapter N, Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-460 (1976),
which currently set water pollution control standards for some forty various industry
groups and subgroups including the petroleum refining group considered here. The joint
promulgation of "guidelines" and "regulations" arose in part from the timetable imposed
upon EPA by the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d
692 (D.C. Cir. 1975), after the Administrator failed to meet the one-year requirement for
publication of guidelines imposed by section 304(b) of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp.
V 1975).
- 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. V 1975).
11Id. § 1311(b), (e).
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The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Senior Judge Breitenstein, held that, while section 301 did not clearly place the responsibility for establishment of effluent limitations at either the
federal or state level and did not refer to "regulations" as such,
since the control technologies are to be established by the Administrator, it is reasonable that he establish the limitations generally applicable to any category." It was also noted 0 that the authority of the Administrator to impose section 301 limitations by
regulations could be derived from section 501(a) which authorizes
him "to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out
his functions under this chapter."'8 This reasoning parallels that
employed by several other circuits in upholding the validity of
effluent limitation regulations pertaining to other industry
groups. 2 The opinion is particularly similar to Judge Breitenstein's (sitting by designation on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals) in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,8 which
considered the validity of EPA effluent regulations for inorganic
chemicals manufacturing. 4 Both the Fourth Circuit case and the
Tenth Circuit case held that the EPA regulations are presumptively binding nationwide and the burden of convincing a state
permit issuer that the general limitations should not apply to a
particular situation is on the permit applicant. 5 A recent decision
of the Supreme Court on the issue of EPA authority has established the validity of the Tenth Circuit's decision here.8
The Tenth Circuit also, in accord with du Pont,87 rejected an
attack on the validity of the regulations insofar as they imposed
limitations in the form of single numbers rather than a range of
" 540 F.2d at 1030.
Id. at 1032.
33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. V 1975).
12 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); American Frozen Food
Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train,
537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
1975); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). Contra, CPC Int'l Inc.
v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977).
40 C.F.R. §§ 415.10-.632 (1976).
ft 541 F.2d 1018, 1028; 540 F.2d at 1030.
11 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977), aff'g 528 F.2d 1136
(4th Cir. 1975), 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).
" 541 F.2d at 1029. Accord, Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620,
630 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044-45
(3d Cir. 1975).
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numbers. This was held to be a valid exercise of general rulemaking in accord with congressional use of the words "best" technology. s8 It was also indicated that the use of single numbers would
be tempered by the variance provisions allowed by the Act, 9
which provisions were also upheld by the court. 0 The court further upheld the validity of all of the 1977 step limitations except
for those relating to storm runoff,9" but invalidated all of the 1983
step limitations because the record revealed no sound basis for
them.92 The analysis of the validity of the various regulations is
essentially the same as that employed in du Pont. The Supreme
Court's decision in that case has provided some resolution of the
imprecise language of the Act and guidance for the Administrator
and for the circuits in their tasks of implementation and review
of standards established under the Act.
IV.

INTERSTATE LAND SALES

In McCown v. Heidler9 3 the Tenth Circuit held that officers
and directors of a corporate developer could be individually liable
for violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.9
Plaintiffs brought private actions alleging claims under the civil
liabilities section of the Act 95 against the officers and directors of
the apparently defunct corporations which had developed and
sold to the plaintiffs lots in a resort subdivision in Oklahoma. The
defendants, alleging that the Act did not extend liability to
"controlling persons" of a development corporation, sought and
were granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs in the
district court. The Tenth Circuit, while recognizing the possibilU 540 F.2d at 1030-31. Section 301(b) of the Act calls for application of the "best
practicable control technology currently available" (BPT) by July 1, 1977 (the 1977 step)
and for application of the "best available technology economically achievable" (BAT) by
July 1, 1983 (the 1983 step). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. II 1972).
1g 540 F.2d at 1031. The variance provisions are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12, .22,
.32, .42, .52 (1976).
" 540 F.2d at 1032-33. The propriety of variance procedures is examined at some
length in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976).
540 F.2d at 1033-38.
o2Id. at 1038.
" 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970).
"1 Id. § 1709. This section provides a private right of action for untrue statements of
a material fact or omissions of a material fact in connection with subdivision sales against
a developer or his agent.
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ity of a strict reading of the definition of "developer," 96 held nevertheless that the remedial, consumer-oriented purposes of the
Act justified extending liability to the officers and directors. 7 The
court noted that liability could be alternatively premised on the
guilt of the officers and directors in aiding and abetting the conduct of the miscreant corporations. The court found the situation
analogous to the civil liability of an aider or abettor in the securities fraud context.9 8
This is the first reported instance in which the Act has been
clearly held to cover officers and directors. The court cites several
cases in general support of its holding, but while all involved suits
which included officers or directors as defendants, each involved
only preliminary matters and not the direct issue here. It has
been held that liability under the Act does not extend to a successor corporation to the actual developer. 0 The decision is well
supported on policy grounds, especially in view of the Act's paral96 Id. § 1701(4) provides that " 'developer' means any person who, directly or indirectly, sells or leases, or offers to sell or lease, or advertises for sale or lease any lots in a
subdivision." It would seem that the definition of agent to include "any person who
represents, or acts for or on behalf of, a developer in selling," id. § 1701(5), could be
construed to include the officers and directors of a corporate developer.
'7 In the words of the court:
The "developer" of a land sale plan is usually a corporate entity which, in a
fraudulent scheme as here alleged, ends up defunct and offers no reserve for
recovery to those persons defrauded; so, too, the end selling agent, when the
development collapses financially, is often long gone or cannot respond pecuniarily ....
The basic protection of the Act, to be meaningful, must be
leveled against the fraudulent planners and profit makers for otherwise the
Act would be pragmatically barren. No legislative enactment should be rendered ineffective to attain its purpose if such a construction can be avoided.
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 [1943] ....
527 F.2d at 207. For a discussion of the rationale supporting a liberal interpretation of the
Act see Note, S. 275-The Interstate Land Sales Full DisclosureAct, 21 RuT. L. REv. 714

(1967).
527 F.2d at 207. See Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirmed denial
of certification as class action); Siebert v. Great Northern Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510 (5th Cir.
1974) (affirmed denial of preliminary injunction and certification as class action); Adolphus v. Zebelman, 486 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973) (action by minority stockholders to enjoin
sales); United States v. Del Rio Springs, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 226 (D. Ariz. 1975) (preliminary motion); United States v. Pocono Int'l Corp., 378 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(preliminary motion).
" Zachery v. Treasure Lake, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Cf. Bettis v.
Lakeland, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (recognizing potential for liability of
successor corporation).
'

"
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lels with the Securities Act of 1933101 which have been specifically
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 02 It is troubling
that the original version of the Act contained a "controlling persons" provision 0 3 which for some reason was not carried forward
into the final legislation. There is no express exclusion of officers
and directors, and, if it is concluded that Congress intended to
leave determination of the precise scope of "developer" to judicial
determination, the Tenth Circuit's position certainly adds to the
effectiveness of the Act.
V. APPLICABILITY OF NEPA
Several cases decided this term considered the necessity of
filing an environmental impact statement (EIS), pursuant to
section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969.104 In Sanborn v. Brinegar'5 the Tenth Circuit upheld an
administrative determination that an EIS was not required. The
Kansas Highway Commission had prepared an extensive Negative Declaration for three highway projects in Wichita, Kansas,
involving $2,000,000 in alterations on 1.94 miles of roadway. The
report of the state commission examined potential impacts and
concluded that there would be no significant environmental impact from the project. The Federal Highway Administration accepted this determination, thus relieving the need for an EIS, and
authorized federal funding for the project. The major dispute
centered around the following conclusion in the Negative Declaration: "Since the predicted noise burden for the project area is
the same whether or not the proposed improvements are completed, the project will not have an adverse environmental impact
on the neighborhood."'' 0 The court determined that these findings were supported by the record and held that the exception
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976). See also L.
RATNER, INTERSTATE LAND SALES 13 (1970).
1 S. 275, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4)(iii) (1967). The conference committee report
on the final version of the Act makes no reference to the definitional sections. CONF. REP.
No. 1785, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2873,
3066-67.
,0142 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
Sanborn v. Brinegar, No. 74-1836 (10th Cir., May 17, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
I" Id. at 9.
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granted by the Highway Administration should be upheld,107 even
though the projected noise levels would be above those levels at
which an EIS is required by Department of Transportation regulations.0 8
In another case involving NEPA, Wyoming v. Hathaway,0°
the Tenth Circuit held that the Environmental Protection
Agency was not required to file an EIS in connection with an
order suspending and cancelling the registration of three predator
control poisons."10 The trial court had found that the order constituted major federal action significantly affecting the environment,"' and, this being the case, the EPA was required to consider all possible alternatives and approaches and to file an EIS
pursuant to NEPA."' The Tenth Circuit considered the two related issues of whether a formal EIS was required"' and whether
there had been substantial compliance with NEPA in the adoption of the order,'" and found in favor of the EPA on both issues.
The court noted the fact that the EPA was not in existence
at the time NEPA became law." 5 Reasoning that the entire function of the EPA is improving the quality of the environment, the
court held that it would be pointless to require the EPA to prepare an impact statement in connection with its own activities.
"If EPA fails to give ample environmental consideration to its
orders, its failure in this regard can be corrected when the order
is judicially reviewed, but collateral review such as was sought
here was never contemplated and is not to be allowed.""' As a
"

Id. at 12.
See 23 C.F.R. §§ 771.10(e), 772.2(i) (1976).

525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).
P.R. Notice 72-2, Mar. 9, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 5718 (1972). The poisons involved were
strychnine, sodium fluoroacetate, and sodium cyanide, used extensively in coyote control
programs. The cancellation was based in part on their toxicity and in part on the indiscriminate pattern of their use. Id.
1" 525 F.2d at 67.
1
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
S 525 F.2d at 71-72.
' Id. at 72-73.
Id.at 71 n.4.
.. 525 F.2d at 72 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Aldrin-Dieldrin II),
510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension
II), 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Aldrin-Dieldrin
I), 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
'
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basis for denying collateral review, the court pointed to the fact
that the relevant statute allows a registrant to file objections and
obtain a public hearing within thirty days after notice of a cancellation.' '7 Additionally any person who will be adversely affected
by a cancellation order may petition, within sixty days of the
entry of an order, for judicial review in the court of appeals." 8 As
pointed out by Judge Seth in dissent, these remedies were not
particularly availing to the plaintiffs here, who, as consumers of
the economic poisons rather than registrants, had no right to seek
a public hearing on the order and would have had no administrative record to present to a circuit court for review." 9
The determination that the EPA is not required to prepare
and file an impact statement in connection with its own actions
has been reached before by this court,'2 ° and by other circuits.'2 '
In each instance it has been held that strict compliance with
NEPA is not needed in connection with EPA regulatory actions.
However, each case, while excusing strict compliance, has turned
on the extensiveness of the public hearing process engaged in by
the EPA in connection with the challenged action. In Anaconda
Co. v. Ruckelshaus'2 2 the EPA had provided a public hearing
process in connection with the challenged regulations. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension 11)123 the
court viewed the extensive public hearings held by the EPA as the
functional equivalent of an impact statement procedure. In
117

7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970). The appellants here (individual users, associations of

users, and the State of Wyoming) were consumers, not registrants who could have sought
hearings on the order.
IS Id. § 135b(d).
525 F.2d at 73 (Seth, J., dissenting).
Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1305 (10th Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension II), 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974) (extensive analysis of legislative history of NEPA); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA,
481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). All of these decisions other
than Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973), involved
actions under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970).
Such actions have subsequently been statutorily exempted from NEPA by the Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 7(c)(1), 88
Stat. 246, 259. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
122 482 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1973).
12 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"o

121
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Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA'24 the court, while holding that strict
NEPA compliance was not required, vacated the challenged actions because the hearing procedures had not supplied adequate
input from interested parties.
It is the court's treatment of the substantial compliance element that is the most troubling here. While prior cases have
excused strict compliance, all have considered the need for some
public airing of the environmental issues involved. The opportunity for public awareness of and input toward federal decisionmaking on environmental issues has been a key element of EIS procedures. 25
' - Indeed a sensitivity toward the need for public hearings
is mandated by the Impact Statement Guidelines of the Council
on Environmental Quality'26 and the EPA Regulations on Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements.'27 As noted by the
court,'28 the Administrator's decision to cancel the poison registrations in question was based upon consideration of detailed
petitions submitted by various conservation groups and upon a
private report prepared under the sponsorship of the Department
of Interior and the Council on Environmental Quality (the Cain
Report).' 29 The Cain Report contains a detailed and extensive
examination of current predator control problems and practices
around the country. No public hearings were held in connection
with the preparation of the report, but nearly 400 persons were
contacted in an effort to gain input. 3 0 Only a few of those contacted or responding represented livestock associations, but it
does appear that the views of the Wyoming Woolgrowers Association, one of the appellants here, were received and considered. 3'
While it is apparent that in relying on the Cain Report the Administrator was presented with serious and well-considered rec.2 481 F.2d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1973).
,25 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 271 (1974).
"
40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (1976).
" Id. § 6.400.
525 F.2d at 68-69.

2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PREDATOR CONTROL, INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNIV.

OF MICH., PREDATOR CONTROL-1971 (1972). The Advisory Committee was
chaired by Stanley A. Cain and the committee's report is, therefore, referred to, both in
general usage and by the court, as the Cain Report.
"' Cain &Kadlec, Forewardto ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PREDATOR CONTROL, INSTITUTE
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNIV. OF MICH., PREDATOR CONTROL-1971 (1972).
"' Id. at 107-08.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.. 54

ommendations, the question remains whether federal decisionmaking should be based on information sifted through a private
data evaluation process or rather should be based on the responsible official's own independent analysis of the relevant information after direct exposure to the competing public concerns.
John H. Evans

WATER LAW: PUEBLO INDIANS' WATER RIGHTS

New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION

This suit' was brought under a New Mexico statute providing
for adjudication of water rights. 2 New Mexico instituted the proceeding for a determination of water rights in the NambePojoaque River system. The parties to the suit were the United
States, New Mexico, approximately 900 private landowners, and
the Pueblos of San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambe, and Tesuque.
Appeal was made to the Tenth Circuit from the New Mexico
District Court's decision that the Pueblos' water rights are subject to the New Mexico appropriation system.
The majority, Judge Breitenstein joined by Judge Hill, held
that the Pueblos are not subject to the state system.3 The Pueblos' rights were held to be superior to all competing claims, except
non-Indians claiming by adverse possession prior to 1858 and
possibly others in situations not before the court in this suit.4
The dissenter, Judge Barrett, would have held that the Pueblos are governed by the appropriation system for their uses existing prior to 1933.1 Uses beginning after 1933 would have been held
independent of the state system.'
I New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. New
Mexico v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1157 (1977).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-4-4 (1953).
537 F.2d at 1112.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
Oid.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Uncertainty as to the Pueblos' water rights arose for two
reasons. First, the Pueblos have a unique history as non-nomadic,
agricultural people whose titles and rights to their lands were
recognized by the Spanish and Mexican governments and by the
United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.7 Second, the
effect of the Acts of June 7, 1924 s and May 31, 19331 are unclear.
These Acts gave compensation for lands and appurtenant waters
lost to non-Indians during a period when the Pueblos' lands were
thought to be freely 'alienable.
The Pueblos are historically sedentary, agricultural groups
with highly organized social structures. The Spanish conquistadores entered the Area in the 1540's and Spain ruled the Pueblos
until 1821. In 1821 Mexico won independence from Spain. Mexico
ruled the Pueblos until 1848, when the territory they occupied
was ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo."' Treaty Articles VIII and IX guaranteed United States
protection of rights recognized by the previous sovereigns.
In 1851 the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834" was
extended to cover the Indians on the lands acquired from Mexico.' 2 These Acts made buying or settling on Indian lands an
offense. 3 In 1858 the Pueblos' titles to their lands were formally
confirmed by Congress. 4 Plenary federal jurisdiction over the
Indians was later guaranteed in the New Mexico Enabling Act of
19101 and the New Mexico Constitution."
Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
Ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636.
Ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108.
0 Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
" Act of Feb. 27, 1851, ch. 14, § 7, 9 Stat. 574, which provided: "That all the laws
now in force, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, or such provisions
of the same as may be applicable, shall be, and the same are hereby, extended over the
Indian tribes in Territories of New Mexico and Utah."
11The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, § 11, 4 Stat. 729, provided
in part: "That if any person shall make a settlement on any lands belonging, secured, or
granted by treaty with the United States to any Indian tribe, or shall survey or shall
attempt to survey such lands, or designate any of the boundaries by marking trees, or
otherwise, such offender shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand dollars."
" Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374. This confirmation specifically included
the land claims of the Pueblos of Tesuque, San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, and Nambe.
15Ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, which provided "that until the title of such Indian or
Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the
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But in 1876 the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Joseph 7 held that the Pueblos were not "Indians"
within the meaning of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. This
supported territorial court decisions that non-Indians could settle
on the Pueblos' lands. Joseph was qualified in 1913,11 and specifically overruled in 1926.11 However, prior to the reversal of Joseph,
about 3,000 adverse claims against the Pueblo lands were initiated.20
In 1924 Congress created a board with authority to settle
these claims and determine compensation due the Pueblos for the
lands and appurtenant waters quieted in the non-Indian claimants."' The board concluded that compensation for the lands lost
should be approximately $35 per acre, the appraised value being
$100 per acre.2 2 The 1933 Congress appropriated about $75 per
acre, $40 in excess of the board's suggestion. 3 The reasons for the
24
different rates are not made clear in the legislative history. Howdisposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States .... "
1,N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 2. The language in the constitution is the same as that in
the Enabling Act, supra note 15.
1794 U.S. 614 (1876). The Joseph case was a prosecution under the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act. The defendant was accused of building and settling on 10 acres of Pueblo
land. The Pueblos were held not to be "Indians" and their lands not to be protected by
the Act, so the defendant was found not guilty.
This was a prosecution for the
'"United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
introduction of liquor into the Santa Clara Pueblo in violation of an 1897 Act making it
an offense to bring liquor into "Indian country." Act of Jan. 30, 1897, ch. 109, 29 Stat.
506. The Court found the defendant guilty and said that Joseph "cannot be regarded as
holding that these Indians or their lands are beyond the range of Congressional power
under the Constitution." 231 U.S. at 49.
" United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926). Candelaria, similar to Joseph,
was a prosecution for fencing and settlement of Pueblo lands. The Court considered the
Pueblos to be "plainly within [the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act] spirit and, in our
opinion, fairly within its words, 'any tribe of Indians.' " 271 U.S. at 441. The defendant
was found guilty.
H.R. REP. No. 787, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1924).
2
Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636.
2' SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 71ST CONG., 2D SESS., SURVEY OF THE CONDITIONS
OF INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES, part 20, 10828 (1932).
Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108.
"[it is impossible to tell from [the 1933 Act] how much is being awarded for ...
excluded lands, how much for change in valuation basis, and how much for alleged loss
of water rights." Letter from Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior, to Edgar
Howard, Chairman of House Comm. on Indian Affairs (April 12, 1932), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 820, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1932).

1977
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ever, Winters v. United States25 may have been an influence. 21
Winters held that water rights, prior and paramount to any subsequent state-created rights, were reserved by the United States
for the Indians at the same time lands were reserved. It is possible
that the larger appropriation was intended to compensate for the
extinguishment of supposed Winters reserved rights.
II. THE Aamodt DECISIONS
A.

The Majority

The majority considered two possible sources for the Pueblos'
water rights: Winters doctrine of reserved rights and aboriginal
rights as recognized by Spain and Mexico.27
The Winters doctrine was first stated in 1908, in a case involving the water rights of a Montana Indian reservation.,' NonIndians were enjoined from building a dam which would interfere
with the flow of water to the reservation. The Winters Court
reasoned that when Congress created the reservation by treaty or
agreement, it must have impliedly reserved enough water to irrigate and make valuable the otherwise worthless, arid reserved
lands.29 The reserved water was exempted from the state appropriation system. 0 Reserved water rights have also been recognized for Indian reservations created by Executive Order, 3' and
other federal reservations of land such as national parks, forests,
33
wildlife refuges, recreation areas, 32 and national monuments.

Each reservation includes enough water to accomplish the pur34
pose of the reserved land.
25 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1113-14.
Id. at 1106.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). For the development of the Winters
doctrine, see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United
States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334
(9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), 330 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1964); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
207 U.S. at 577.
= Id.
" Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963). This was a suit to determine the
rights of the respective states to the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries.
.1 Id. at 601.
'1 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). The Court found here that when
Devil's Hole was declared a National Monument water rights had been reserved to preserve a unique species of fish living only in Devil's Hole.
" See generally Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-the Winters Doctrine Updated, 6
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The Act of Dec. 22, 1858,' 5 which confirmed the Pueblos'
titles provided that it "shall only be construed as a relinquishment of all title and claim of the United States to any of said
lands."3 Such a relinquishment is not equivalent to a reservation,37 so the United States made no reservation of land for the
Pueblos. The majority reasoned that no water rights could have
been reserved by the United States for the Pueblos, since no land
was reserved. The Winters doctrine was thus "not technically
applicable."3 8
Having rejected the Winters doctrine theory, the majority
apparently adopted the aboriginal rights theory. Aboriginal rights
arise from actual, exclusive, and continuous use and occupancy
"for a long time."39 Once the rights are established, they are good
against all except the sovereign. 0 Such rights can only be extinguished by "plain and unambiguous" action." The aboriginal
rights may be "recognized" by Congress and are then good
against the sovereign.42 Although the concept is usually applied
to land title, aboriginal rights have also been discussed for lakefishing rights,43 minerals," timber,4" and tidelands.4" The doctrine
GONZAGA L. REv. 215 (1971); Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it Grew: Federal
Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REv. 639; Veeder, Indian Prior
and Paramount Rights Versus State Rights, 51 N.D.L. REv. 107 (1974); Veeder, Winters
Doctrine Rights-Keystone of National Programsfor Western Land and Water Conservation and Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REv. 149 (1965); Comment, Application of the Winters
Doctrine: Quantification of the Madison Formation, 21 S.D.L. REv. 144 (1976). State
water rights have also been defeated through federal legislation such as reclamation project acts. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
11 Ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374.
"

Id.

"

New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1111.

3 Id.

Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 491 (1967); Sac and Fox
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 315 F.2d 896, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1963). "A long time" has been
defined as 50 years or long enough to make the area "domestic." United States v. Seminole
Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 387 (1967); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Res. v.
United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 193 (1966). For a discussion of the colonial attitude toward
aboriginal rights, see Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8Wheat.) 543 (1823).
, Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
" Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 492 (1967).
,2Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972),
supplemented 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on othergrounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). Pyramid Lake recognized that the area was
the aboriginal home of the Paiutes but emphasized the reserved rights.
" United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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has not previously been applied to water rights. Aboriginal land
rights were established for the New Mexico Pueblos in United
States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso.4 7 This case also held that the
1924 and 1933 Land Claims Settlement Acts did not extinguish
4
those rights. 1
The majority found that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo"5
recognized the Pueblos' rights in its promise to protect all rights
recognized by the previous sovereigns.'" The aboriginal rights
would not be subject to the state appropriation system because
the United States never relinquished its plenary control.' The
majority did not further define the Pueblos' rights, that being a
matter for interpretation of the Spanish and Mexican laws from
which the aboriginal rights derive. 5 However, the court did decide the relative priorities of the Pueblos and three groups of nonIndian claimants.
The first group consisted of non-Indians claiming adverse
rights prior to the 1858 congressional recognition of the Pueblos'
titles. This group may have some valid claims because the 1858
Act also recognized any adverse claims against the Pueblos. The
laws of Spain and Mexico were held to be determinative of the
priority of adverse claims arising before 1858.51
The second group consisted of non-Indians claiming rights
after 1858 but not depending on the 1924 and 1933 Acts. The court
recognized the possibility of such claims but did not have a specific case before it. So no determination of priority for this group
was made. 4
The third group consisted of non-Indians claiming under the
1924 and 1933 Acts. This group was held to have rights secondary
to the Pueblos because the 1933 Act 55 provided that it was not to
1 Oneida Tribe of Indians v. United States, 165 Ct. C1. 487, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
946 (1964).
:6Heckman v. Sutter, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902).
7 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. C1. 1975).
Id. at 1388.
" Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
537 F.2d at 1111.
Id. at 1112.
52 This interpretation is to be made by the district court on remand.
537 F.2d at 1112.
I/d.
Ch. 45, § 9, 48 Stat. 108.
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be construed to "deprive any of the Pueblo Indians of a prior right
to the use of water."56 The words "prior right" suggested to the
majority that Congress had determined the nature of the Pueblos'
rights to be generally superior. Any rights claimed under the 1924
and 1933 Acts must be secondary, because otherwise they would
interfere with the prior rights recognized by Congress. 7 The majority found that Congress did not impliedly relinquish its plenary
control of the Pueblos through the Acts of 1924 and 1933.
Although the majority termed the Winter reserved rights
doctrine "not technically applicable"5 8 to the Pueblos' rights, the
opinion suggested 9 that the Pueblos' rights may be quantified by
the "practicably irrigable acres" standard defined in Arizona v.
California,' a reserved rights case. The majority also referred to
another reserved rights case, Cappaertv. United States"'saying
that a balancing of competing economic interests is not required
in determining federally reserved rights.2 Under that doctrine,
economic hardship to the non-Indians would not be considered in
the decision of the Pueblos' priorities. 3 So the majority refused
to classify the Pueblos' rights as Winters doctrine reserved rights,
but nonetheless applied the Winters doctrine cases to supply
standards for quantifying the Pueblos' rights.
Thus the majority, declining to define fully the nature of the
Pueblos' rights, did decide that the state has no jurisdiction and
that Congress understood the Pueblos to have priority over the
non-Indians taking under the 1924 and 1933 Acts.
B.

The Dissent
The dissent differed from the majority in saying that Con5' 537 F.2d at 1112.
Id.

at 1111.
"' Id. at 1113.
" Id.

373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). See Kiechel & Burke, Federal-StateRelations in Water
Resources Adjudication and Administration;Integration of Reserved Rights with Appropriative Rights, 18 RoCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 531 (1973); Note, A Proposalfor the Quantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1974); Comment, The
McCarran Amendment-A Method of Clarifying the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 7
LAND & WATER L. REv. 587 (1972).
" 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
537 F.2d at 1113.
It is possible that aboriginal rights also do not involve a balancing of economic
interests. The cases on aboriginal rights do not discuss this point.
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gress intended to relinquish its plenary control of the Pueblos and
chose to do so through implication in the 1933 Act. No express
relinquishment is found, but the dissent would read it into the
1933 Act.
The dissent defined the Pueblos' rights in terms of the 1933
Act. The extra money allotted in that Act was seen as compensation for a loss of the Pueblos' general priority. The priority had
to be relinquished if there was an actual loss of water rights, as
the dissent would have held." The 1933 Act settled priorities for
the Pueblo water rights as of that date as being subject to the
state appropriation system, on parity with the rights of nonIndians who took title under the 1933 Act. New Pueblo uses would
not be subject to the state system and would have priority." The
reasoning for the priority of post-1933 new uses was not explained,
except that such new uses were not involved in the "compromise"
of the 1933 Act. 6
The dissent and the majority also disagreed on the extent to
which the Pueblos are subject to New Mexico's appropriation
system. However, both the dissent and the majority rejected the
district court's holding that the Pueblos are completely subject
to the state's water laws. Both opinions found that the Pueblos
have rights outside the state system, although neither opinion
relied on the reserved rights doctrine. The Pueblos' water rights
are thus a new category of federal water rights, neither created
by federal reservation nor subject to the state system.
III.

ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

The Aamodt decision raised two issues that will need to be
resolved in the future: the nature of the Pueblos' aboriginal rights
and the system of quantification and priorities to be used in distributing the water.
In determining the nature of the Pueblos' rights, the case of
Los Angeles v. San Fernando7 is helpful. There the court exam537 F.2d at 1118-19.
IId. at 1120.
Ild.

,14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). This was a suit brought by
Los Angeles claiming prior rights, under the "pueblo rights doctrine," to the water of the
Upper Los Angeles River area. Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654
(1958), found that the "pueblo rights doctrine" applies to New Mexico. See also R. CLRK,
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ined the water rights system used in California during the Spanish and Mexican rule. It was found that water was generally to
be used in "common""6 but certain agricultural communities
called "pueblos" were given priority in custom, usage, and official
directives." These pueblos were not Indian communities. The
reasons for the priority were that the pueblos were the basic units
of settlement and development in the New World, and that the
pueblos' agricultural products were of highest importance. 0 The
Pueblos of New Mexico may have had a similar priority of water
rights. Their communities were also agricultural, provided sustenance, and were a first instance of permanent settlement. The
California pueblos enjoyed an expanding right, which grew as the
pueblos' municipal needs grew." The right was not measured by
irrigable acres, as federally reserved rights are," but was based on
both municipal and agricultural needs. 3 Thus the rights derived
from the Spanish and Mexican laws may be very different from
those derived from federal reservation.
When the nature of the Pueblos' rights has been decided, the
problem remains of formulating a workable distribution of the
water. Both the majority and the dissent spoke in terms of historic uses which may be impossible to determine. The problem
is also made more difficult by the confusion of "use" and "right."
The Pueblos' rights may be limited to the quantity historically
used," may be expandable to meet growing needs, 5 or may be
unrelated to "uses" and depend only on the measurement of irrigNEW MEXICO WATER RESOURCES LAW 41-43 (1964); 1

C.

KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER

RIGHTS 2590-93 (2d ed. 1912); 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 68-69 (3d
ed. 1911).
11Recopilaci6n de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, Book 4, Title 17, Laws 5, 7
(Compiled 1680), quoted in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 537 P.2d
at 1275-76, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.

IId.
,oId. at 234, 237, 537 P.2d at 1276, 1278, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 27, 29.
Id. at 252, 537 P.2d at 1289, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
7 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 232, 537 P.2d at 1275, 123 Cal. Rptr.
at 26.
" See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1120.
See Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 232, 252, 537 P.2d at 1275, 1289,
123 Cal. Rptr. at 26, 40 (1975). Section 9 of the 1933 Act indicates that the Pueblos' rights
are not limited to irrigation, but are for "domestic, stock-water, and irrigation purposes."
Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, § 9, 48 Stat. 108.
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able acres.76 The relationship between "use" and "right" must be
more clearly defined so that some disposition of the available
waters may be made.
Hopefully, the rights of the Pueblos will not be dealt with as
aboriginal rights, "[w]hatever those rights may have been,""
until the water system is so critically overburdened that a real
quantification system is imposed. When such becomes the case,
the lawmakers may be tempted to follow the example of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act7" in handling the extinguishment and compensation of previously undefined aboriginal
rights.7" There the Native Alaskans had various real property
rights which had been recognized by the Russian sovereign. When
Alaska was sold to the United States, the treaty contained a
provision promising to protect those claims recognized by previous sovereigns.8" The development of Alaska proceeded a step
ahead of the definition of those aboriginal rights. In 1971 Congress
responded to the developers' desires to be unhampered by enormous and valuable native claims covering 100% of the state by
passing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The Act provided that almost all aboriginal claims were thereby extinguished"' and would be compensated by money payments 8 and
limited selection of land rights. This legislative solution of the
Alaskan aboriginal claims problem was certainly complete and
conclusive, but the effect on the Alaskans may not be favorable
in the long term.
7,See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1113; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
596, 600 (1963).
" New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1111.
7,43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (Supp. IV 1974).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in [19711
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2192; S. REP. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.
REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2297; S. REP. No. 581, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Block, Alaskan Native Claims, 4 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 223 (1971); Crews, Clouds over Alaska-the Native Claims, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 460 (1970).
Treaty with Russia, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No.
301.
3. 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (Supp. IV 1974).
.2 Id.

§ 1605.

- Id. § 1611.
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CONCLUSION

The Aamodt case was remanded for an analysis of the Spanish and Mexican origins of the Pueblos' rights. This determination is certainly needed, but the court has already decided the
priority relationships. A more consistent approach is called for
where the rights being adjudicated are so vital. The possibility of
an ultimate disposition of the Pueblos' aboriginal rights in the
manner of the disposition of the Native Alaskan rights should be
avoided. The justice of trading money for resources that cannot
be replaced by purchase is questionable. This is especially true
in the Pueblos' southwestern area, where the water supply is inadequate and the land is worthless without water rights.
Wendy J. Busch

GRAZING LANDS MANAGEMENT

Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d
1397 (10th Cir. 1976)
INTRODUCTION

In a case involving possibly far-reaching environmental consequences, Judge Doyle for the Tenth Circuit considered the authority of the Secretary of the Interior and his delegees with respect to the sanction of revocation of a grazing license issued
pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act.' A case of first impression,
Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton' reached the Tenth Circuit
on appeal from the Wyoming District Court's review of the administrative action.' Although the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19761 (FLPMA) has mooted some aspects of the
Diamond Ring Ranch controversy, the opinion is still valuable for
its interpretation and review of the Secretary's discretion to revoke grazing licenses and as an example of the Tenth Circuit's
attitude toward environmental issues.
143
2

U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970).
531 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1976).

1 Judge Doyle affirmed district court jurisdiction predicated on 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1970); see notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text infra.
4 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. IV 1976).
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. The Administrative Process and Review by the District
Court
The plaintiff, Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc., held a Section 3
grazing license 5 under the Taylor Grazing Act. This license entitled the Ranch to graze cattle on areas of the Horse Heaven
Pasture, located within the Lander Grazing District in Wyoming.
In addition, the Ranch owned land located within the Pasture
and held grazing rights under a permit on other state-owned
land.'
Diamond Ring Ranch first obtained a grazing license under
the Act in 1966; the license was renewed annually thereafter. The
1971 license, in effect at the time here concerned, provided that
the Ranch would abide by all rules and regulations' relating to
the license."
On June 15, 1971, the Ranch sprayed 5,000 acres of the Horse
Heaven Pasture, of which 3,600 acres were federally owned, with
herbicide 2,4D,1 in order to eradicate large amounts of sagebrush.'" The spraying was subsidized by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) upon the Ranch's representation that only its private land had been sprayed." The
I Ten-year grazing permits and annual grazing licenses are issued by district range
managers, employees of the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior,
with the advice of a local stockmen's advisory board. Permit issuing procedures, permittee qualifications, and other details are governed by the Federal Range Code, 43 C.F.R.
§§ 4100 to 4115.2-6 (1975).
Congress had ratified the Secretary's authority to issue yearly grazing licenses in
addition to the term permits provided for in the Act by routinely appropriating money
for improvements out of the revenues from the yearly license fees. Brooks v. Dewar, 313
U.S. 354 (1941). Under the National Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
the Secretary is now specifically allowed to issue permits for a period of less than ten years
under certain circumstances. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(b) (Supp. IV 1976).
The terms "permit" and "license," as hereinafter used, have the same meaning unless
distinguished by the context.
531 F.2d at 1399.
43 C.F.R. §§ 4100 to 4115.2-6 (1975), promulgated by authority of 43 U.S.C. § 315a
(1970).
531 F.2d at 1399.
2,4D, or Dow Esteron 99 Concentrate, is a growth inducer which causes a dramatic
increase in a plant's growth rate, leading to the plant's death. For a discussion of the
problems with 2,4D, see Wisconsin v. Butz, 389 F. Supp. 1065, 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
531 F.2d at 1399-400.
The ASCS is a cost-sharing program administered by the Department of Agricul-
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Ranch failed to obtain the prior permission of the Bureau 1of
Land
3
Management (BLM)I2 before spraying the federal lands.
BLM personnel first discovered on July 28, 1971, that federal
land had been sprayed, and, after investigation, issued a notice
of violation to Diamond Ring Ranch." The notice alleged that
3,600 acres of public land had been sprayed, without requisite
permission, and that the Ranch's conduct amounted to a willful"3
violation of the regulations. The Department of Interior sought a
three-year suspension of the Ranch's license in Horse Heaven
Pasture and a twenty-five percent reduction of its grazing privileges on other licensed lands as a penalty for the actions.
After a prolonged hearing, the hearing examiner found that,
although the Ranch's actions were willful," the herbicide was not
harmful to animals, no damage was done to wildlife, no suspension of grazing was necessary in order to protect the range, and,
in fact, the sprayed lands had actually been benefited.'" Accordingly, the examiner suspended the imposition of a sanction, in
effect placing the Ranch on probation for one year. 8
On appeal the Interior Board of Land Appeals reversed the
examiner's findings as to any beneficial effects of the spraying,
finding that some wildlife does use sagebrush for forage, and
ture to provide funds to private land owners carrying out conservation and forestry practices. 7 C.F.R. § 701.1 (1976).
The ASCS program is not applicable to "noncropland owned by the United States
• . . including, but not limited to, grazing lands administered by. . . the Bureau of Land
Management (including lands administered under the Taylor Grazing Act) ......
7
C.F.R. § 701.8(b) (1976).
" "Cutting, burning, or removing vegetative cover" is allowed only after a permit is
issued by a BLM official. 43 C.F.R. § 4112.3-1(e) (1975).
" 531 F.2d at 1398.
" Id. at 1400.
lb 43 U.S.C.
§ 315a (1970) specifically provides a fine of not more than $500 as a
penalty for "willful" violations of the Act or the rules and regulations.
' 531 F.2d at 1400.
The hearing examiner's finding of willfulness was upheld by the Tenth Circuit after
a discussion of the applicable definition and the scope of review. 531 F.2d at 1404-06. The
issue of willfulness has been mooted by the FLPMA, which allows the Secretary to issue
a sanction for "any violation" of the regulations and conditions. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a)
(Supp. IV 1976).
" Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397
(10th Cir. 1976). The beneficial effects of 2,4D spraying include an increased growth of
forage and additional water in the soil, making it more resistant to erosion. Brief for
Appellee at 49-51.
l, 531 F.2d at 1400.

LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES

noted that the BLM requires that all grazing be suspended for one
year after any chemical treatment of grazing lands. 20 The Board
also vacated the Ranch's probation and actually suspended its
grazing license for two years with respect to the acreage sprayed.,'
The district court, in reviewing the administrative record,
found that the Ranch's actions had not been willful, but rather
innocent and in good faith, and that, in any event, the maximum
sanction the agency may impose is a $500 fine.Y The Secretary
appealed the district court's ruling to the Tenth Circuit.
B.

Appeal to the Tenth Circuit
1.

Authority of the Secretary.

The first issue discussed by the Tenth Circuit was whether
the Taylor Grazing Act provides authority for the agency to suspend, reduce, or revoke a permit or license for violation of the Act
or the regulations promulgated thereunder, or whether sanctions
are limited to the statutory $500 fine.
The court's upholding of the suspension, reduction, and revocation power, while not finally determinative of the case,23 was
not merely gratuitous. The Secretary recognized that the case
could be decided simply on the traditional standard of review
grounds but invited the court to consider the issue of the extent
of the Secretary's authority, arguing that such a determination
was critical to the Secretary's continued ability to manage public
2
lands effectively.
Accepting the invitation, the court held that the Secretary
does possess such authority, and recognized that (1) broad regulatory power is granted to the Secretary by the Taylor Grazing
Act;2 5 (2) the legislative history of the Act indicates that the $500
12 Interior Bd. Land App. 358, 365-66 (1973).
531 F.2d at 1400.
22Id.
" The court could have held merely that the agency's modification of the sanction
2
21

imposed by the hearing examiner was an abuse of discretion (as it did; see notes 37-56
and accompanying text infra) and never have reached the issue of whether the agency
actually has the authority to suspend a grazing permit or license.
' Brief for Appellant at 35.
" 531 F.2d at 1401-02. The Taylor Grazing Act requires the Secretary of the Interior
to "make provision for [the grazing districts'] protection, administration, regulation, and
improvement," and to
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fine provision was not intended to eliminate possible administrative sanctions but was aimed primarily at trespassers;26 (3) Congress has impliedly ratified the Secretary's interpretaion of his
authority under the Act;2 and (4) a line of condemnation cases
holds that a permit or license, conferring no rights, is not a compensable property interest under the fifth amendment's just com28
pensation clause.
Although the recent passage of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 now provides specific revocation authority for the Secretary,2 an examination of the Act's legislative
origins indicates that the revocation authority provision resulted
make such rules and regulations. . . and do any and all things necessary to
accomplish the purposes of [the Act] and to insure the objects of such
grazing districts, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve
the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary injury, to provide
for the orderly use, improvement, and development of the range ....
43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970).
Nevertheless, this discretion is not without limits. While a grazing permit remains
outstanding, the Federal Government may not interfere with it (as by aiding or encouraging third parties to use the lands covered) and the Secretary has an obligation under the
Act to adequately safeguard permits issued thereunder. Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d
738 (10th Cir. 1949); see generally 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1970).
11 531 F.2d at 1402-03. The court relied heavily on excerpts from the Senate debate
of June 12, 1934, held shortly before passage of the Act, to support its holding that the
$500 fine was never intended to be an exclusive sanction, and suggested that such an
interpretation would be an "absurdity." 531 F.2d at 1402. While the language quoted by
the court, taken out of context, appears to support that conclusion, a careful reading of
the entire debate suggests that the fine was considered "all the power that is needed" and
"ample punishment." See 78 CONG. REc. 11139-47 (1934).
" 531 F.2d at 1403. In a number of cases at the administrative hearing level where
the violation involved a trespass, the agency reduced grazing privileges conferred by
existing permits or licenses. Eugene Miller, 67 Interior Dec. 116 (1960); Clarence S. Miller,
67 Interior Dec. 145 (1960); J. Leonard Neal, 66 Interior Dec. 215 (1959). These cases were
never reviewed in a judicial proceeding.
The court here specifically cited the passage of the Classification and Multiple Use
Act, 43 U.S.C. 6§ 1411-1418 (1970) and its legislative history, S. REP. No. 1506, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3755, 3756, as approving the agency's procedures for public lands management. 531 F.2d at 1403.
For an analysis of ratification of the Secretary's implied authority in the mineral
leasing context, see Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963).
" 531 F.2d at 1404. The court's attempt to analogize to the condemnation cases
overlooked the fact that the agency's power of revocation has been defined strictly within
the condemnation context. The power of the agency to revoke a permit or license in that
context was never seriously questioned. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488
(1973); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951);
United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951).
- 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a) (Supp. IV 1976).
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from the same Interior Department interpretations of the 30Taylor
Grazing Act that the court relied on in its determination.
The FLPMA provides authority for the agency to "cancel or
suspend a grazing permit or lease for any violation of a grazing
regulation." 3' This provision appeared only in the House version 3
but generated no debate there,3 3 and it was incorporated into the
final bill by the Conference Committee.3 4 Basis for much of the
Act is found in the reports of the Public Land Law Review Com35
mission, which noted that the Interior Department regulations
provided for permit revocation.3 The FLPMA, as noted above,
specifically ratifies the Interior Department's interpretations of
its powers under the Taylor Grazing Act.
2.

Agency Abuse of Discretion.

Finally, the court considered whether the Secretary's discretion under the Taylor Grazing Act is so broad as to preclude
judicial review of the sanction imposed by the agency. After first
establishing that the agency's actions under the Taylor Grazing
Act are not within the limited class of nonreviewable agency ac38
tions, 3 and affirming original jurisdiction in the district court,
the court proceeded to its review. Employing the "clearly erroneous" standard, 39 the court held that the agency's choice of sancSee note 27 and accompanying text supra.
43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a) (Supp. IV 1976) (emphasis added).
3,H.R. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976).
122 CONG. REc. H7581-655 (daily ed. July 22, 1976).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976).
43 C.F.R. § 9239.3-2 (1975).
3' 2 UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO, THE FORAGE RESOURCE (Study for the Public Land Law
Review Commission) 11-31 to 35 (1969).
" 531 F.2d at 1406. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970) excludes from judicial review only
those agency actions precluded by statute from judicial review or committed to agency
discretion by law. Courts interpret this section narrowly. Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061
(10th Cir. 1975); Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
There is no presumption against review absent a clear showing of legislative intent to
commit an agency's acts to its own discretion. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F.
Supp. 78 (D.C. Kan.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1973).
2' District court proceedings are contemplated by 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970). School Bd.
v. HEW, 475 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1973); Rettinger v. FTC, 392 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1968).
' "ITihe court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
"
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tion was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion, and reinstated the
hearing examiner's suspended sanction. 0
Although the agency's decision carries a presumption of regularity,4 the court relied on several cases to support the proposition that an arbitrary choice of remedies or abuse of discretion
must be set aside.42 The cited cases could, however, have been
distinguished.
One of the cited cases, Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States,4" was remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
not because of agency error, but because the intervening passage
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959"4
so changed the complexion of the case that a new agency adjudication was necessary. 5 The other cited cases, Camp v. Pitts" and
National Nutritional Foods Association v. Weinberger,47 were
remanded to the respective agencies for further consideration
because the "inadequacy of explanation frustrate[d] review." 48
In none of these cases did the courts set aside agency actions
merely because, in their judgment, the agency "went quite far"4
in its imposition of a penalty.
In reversing the penalty imposed by the agency, both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit relied on evidence indicating
that no harm occurred as a result of the spraying; there was,
however, substantial evidence 0 in the record to the contrary.5'
531 F.2d at 1407.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
02 531 F.2d at 1407.
,3371 U.S. 156 (1962).
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
" The Court noted that "[t]his [failure to consider the impact of the new act] was,
of course, the District Court's, and not the Commission's, error." 371 U.S. at 172 n.22.
" 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
,7512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975).
00 National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975).
The court noted that even where a court uses the "arbitrary, capricious" standard,
"agency action will not be upheld where inadequacy of explanation frustrates review....
Where the agency's 'finding is not sustainable on the administrative record made, then
the . . .decision must be vacated and the matter remanded [to the agency] for further
consideration."' Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)).
4'531 F.2d at 1407.
Substantial evidence is quantitatively less than the weight of the evidence, and,
therefore, an agency's finding may be supported by substantial evidence and still not be
the only finding possible in light of the evidence. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
11 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
00

"
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Even though the examiner's probationary approach may have
been "reasonable, '52 and even though the Tenth Circuit agreed
with that approach, a court may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the agency unless it finds there has been a "clear error
of judgment." 53 Although the court used the talismanic phrase
"clearly erroneous," 54 in fact it merely substituted a penalty it
considered "much more in keeping with the underlying facts."55
The court reexamined and reweighed the evidence and drew its
own conclusion, substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency."

II.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS

The Issue Raised by the National Wildlife Federation

The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) intervened as amicus curiae because of its concern over the effect of the spraying
on range wildlife and the effect of the district court's ruling on the
agency's range management powers. The NWF contended that,
contrary to the examiner's findings, range wildlife was harmed by
the spraying because certain species use the sagebrush for forage.57 While the court did not reach the issue,5" the NWF argued
that, even if the Taylor Act did not authorize the agency to revoke
a permit, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 5 provides an alternate and independent source of authority. 0
B.

The Environmental Impact Statement
NEPA is intended to formulate an approach to governmental
531 F.2d at 1407.
5' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
5 531 F.2d at 1407.
52

Id.

5' A reviewing court is directed to give proper respect to the ability of the administrative agency to weigh evidence. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966).
" Brief for Amicus Curiae at 30-34. The species include sage grouse, antelope and
deer, the black-tailed jackrabbit, the sage sparrow, Brewer's sparrow, and sage thrasher.
' 531 F.2d at 1404.
5' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1970).
Section 2 of the Taylor Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970), requires the Secretary of the
Interior to protect the grazing districts. The NWF argued in its brief that NEPA requires
proper environmental safeguards to be taken, in light of the decision in Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.. 1971), which held that
agencies must seriously consider action to avoid environmental costs. Arguably in this
case such action would be license revocation.
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activity that will encourage the positive aspects of man's interaction with his environment." To that end, Congress declared it to
be the "continuing responsibility" of the Federal Government to
use "all practicable means," among other things, to "preserve
important . . . natural aspects of our national heritage" and to
"enhance the quality of renewable resources." 2
To ensure implementation of this important national policy,
federal agencies are required to file an environmental impact
statement (EIS) whenever proposed activity would constitute
"major Federal [action] significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 63 Virtually all agencies are subject to
NEPA's EIS requirement," and full and good-faith compliance is
required 65
C.

The EIS and Permitted Spraying

In noting that no real harm was shown from the Ranch's
actions, 6 Judge Doyle overlooked the fact that other courts have
held that spraying with herbicides does have a significant effect
on the environment. Had the Ranch properly requested the BLM
to grant permission to spray, the BLM, on the basis of the prior
cases, would have first been required to file an EIS.67 In finding
61 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970).
2 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
11 The Statement must be detailed, setting forth the proposed action's environmental
impact, any adverse but unavoidable consequences, alternatives considered, the
"relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity" and a listing of "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
" National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 156-57 (D. Kan.), afj'd, 455
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974), held that:
[NEPA's] purpose is to assure that, by following the procedures that it
prescribes, agencies will be fully aware of the impact of their decisions when
they make them. The procedures . . . are designed to secure the accomplishment of the vital purpose of NEPA. That result can be achieved only if the
prescribed procedures are faithfully followed; grudging, pro forma compliance will not do.
U 531 F.2d at 1407.
" Wisconsin v. Butz, 389 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (where only a general EIS
on use of herbicides in the "Eastern Region" had been filed, EIS required for spraying
forest areas with 2,4D); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (EIS required for
program of spraying water hyacinths with 2,4D); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Morton, No. 10113 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 15, 1974) (case dismissed when Department of
Interior agreed to prepare EIS before spraying herbicides on public lands in Roswell, New
Mexico).
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that "there [did] not appear to be much indication that the
particular spraying was seriously detrimental to the public
land," and that the issue was of "limited relevancy,""8 the court
has retreated from recent cases attempting to regulate the use of
herbicides because of concern for their long-term effects on the
environment. 9
D.

The EIS and Agency Sanctions

The Federal Land Policy and Management Act 70 codifies the
BLM's procedures relating to environmental planning and impact, declaring as its policy that public lands be managed so as
to protect and preserve all aspects of the environment. 7' The
FLPMA places high importance on land use planning for public
lands,7" including federal rangelands administered under the
Taylor Act,73 where the planning vehicle is an "allotment management plan."7 4
A recent case, holding that no conflict could be found between the Taylor Grazing Act and NEPA to exempt the former
from EIS requirements, has ordered the BLM to file an EIS in
conjunction with its program of issuing grazing permits and licenses,7" although the court did not go so far as to require an EIS for
each individual license or permit.76 The court did not, however,
consider whether an EIS would be required in connection with an
agency law-enforcement action such as is the case here, where a
possible sanction might significantly affect the environment.
a' 531 F.2d at 1400.
" See cases cited note 67 supra.
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. IV 1976).
I' § 1701(a)(8).
Id.
7 Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711-1714.
7
" Id. § 1 02(e).
7, Id. § 1702(k).
11 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 837-38
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mer., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
Congress has ratified the court's decision by stating that nothing in FLPMA is intended to interfere with the BLM's EIS program as approved by the court. H.R. REP. No.
94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976). In addition, the provisions in the FLPMA declaring that certain distributions and uses of range-improvement funds do not come under
EIS requirements "do not affect [NEPA's] applicability to other aspects of grazing
operation of BLM.
... Id.
7' 388 F. Supp. at 838. Cf. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776
(1976), rev'g Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed at
length in Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group v. Hills, 420 F. Supp. 582 (D. Colo. 1976).
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Such a question appears to have arisen only once, in GiffordHill & Co. v. FTC." That court held that the FTC, while acting
in its enforcement capacity, is not subject to the requirements of
NEPA, even where its actions may have environmental consequences.7" Although NEPA was not intended to repeal other statutes by implication,7" cases excepting an agency from NEPA generally occur only when their policies are superior to those of
NEPA. 80
The Taylor Act's policies and those of the FLMPA, however,
are not in conflict with NEPA, but rather in harmony in their
concern for the protection of the environment.8 A consistent interpretation of both statutes would require an agency, where more
than one alternative sanction exists, to examine the environmental ramifications of each.8"
Given the new statutory authority contained in the FLMPA
for permit revocation and suspensions and the new mandate for
intensive range management, the BLM should carefully examine
71389 F. Supp. 167, 174-75, 176 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(on procedural grounds; the circuit court did not reach the merits of the case discussed in
note 78 infra).
" The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin an FTC antitrust adjudicatory
proceeding on the grounds that it had failed to file an EIS. The court found two categories
of federal actions covered by NEPA: (1) federal actions with direct impact on the environment and (2) actions by nonfederal parties requiring federal permission. The court held
this FTC adjudication fell into neither category.
" The policies of NEPA supplement those found in "existing authorizations of Federal agencies." 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1970). Accord, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,
694 (1973).
" In each case, the court took a "time is of the essence" approach: Flint Ridge Dev.
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976), rev'g Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520
F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975) (NEPA must yield to necessities of time limits imposed on the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of 1968); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973) (natural
gas shortage); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1154
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (Congressional declaration of deadline for agency action);
Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (price controls). See Note,
1975 DUKE L.J. 743.
" 43 U.S.C. § 315 and 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). "The Taylor Act is not purely environmental since it is aimed at promoting the highest use of public lands; NEPA seeks to
protect the environment." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F.
Supp. 829, 838 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mer., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
913 (1976).
12Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 743, 751-52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970) requires the study,
development, and description of "appropriate alternatives" when there are "unresolved
conflicts" concerning environmental impact.
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the environmental effects of permit revocation and formulate a
consistent policy for its use as a sanction. A programmatic EIS
covering its use appears to be indicated. Unfortunately, the
Tenth Circuit's decision in DiamondRing that the revocation was
an abuse of discretion leaves the BLM without any indication as
to what type of violation would properly trigger a loss of grazing
privileges. Further judicial clarification of this issue is likely as
the BLM intensifies its efforts in the area of range management.
PatriciaC. Brennan Tisdale

